Tanks or no Tanks - Putin has already lost the War in Ukraine

There has been much talk in recent days of Ukraine being supplied with tanks in time for an upcoming spring offensive in which Russia will commit thousands of more troops to their fledging war effort. According to numerous military experts, tanks could prove to be decisive in this war since they could allow the Ukrainians to go on the offensive, breach Russian defensive positions and speed up territorial gains. Western tanks, such as the German made Leopard 2, are also far superior to Russian tanks and this could give Ukrainian forces a huge advantage in symmetric battles and help to thwart Russian offensive manoeuvres.

In my view, regardless of tank warfare Putin has already lost the war in Ukraine in that it is now impossible for him to achieve his original war aims or even retreat with any semblance of dignity. His decision to go to war was based on a series of assumptions that turned out to be untrue. Putin assumed European energy dependence would keep nations such as Germany and France neutral, he assumed the USA and UK would fear his nuclear deterrent enough to not supply Ukraine with advanced weaponry and any subsequent sanctions would be mild and manageable. Of course, things did not quite go according to plan with Ukraine now being a large recipient of weapons and finance from across Europe and North America and the war has become a cause celebre.

However, the worst mistake Putin made was to assume the Ukrainians would not resist. There is a saying in geo-politics circles that goes “never get into a suffering contest with Russia”, to which one could add “unless you are Ukraine”. War, like any other form of physical combat, is psychological as much as it is physical and, ultimately, having a mind-set that is conducive to victory is a huge advantage. In fact, a mind-set underpinned by a strong determination to triumph regardless of cost is so valuable in warfare that it is often the deciding factor.

In the run up to the war, Putin attempted to convince his people (and perhaps even himself) that Ukraine was not a real nation and the locals would be honoured to be ruled from Moscow. He went on to espouse the view that Ukraine was so corrupt that a Russian invasion would be welcomed as a form of liberation from the plutocratic oligarchs who currently rule. A swift military victory was to be followed the imposition of a puppet regime that would serve Moscow’s aims and quickly win the support of the masses who ultimately see the Russian motherland as their spiritual home.

Putin was not only wrong on most of his key assumptions but he launched a war that is now helping to forge that which he fears most and claims does not exist, namely a strong and independent Ukrainian identity. A sense of nationhood is often rooted in a shared mythology, which in turn, is rooted in a shared experience that involves a great deal of pain, suffering and sacrifice. The American War of Independence helped to shape the American sense of nationhood, just as the liberation struggle against the British Raj helped to shape the Indian sense of nationhood and identity. In a similar way, the Ukrainian struggle against the Russian invasion is giving its people a strong sense of purpose, unity, nationhood and identity. In the face of such unity and resilience a military victory is practically impossible.

Compounding the aforementioned phenomenon is the fact that Russian weapons, military tactics and morale turned out to be quite abysmal, largely due to corruption and nepotism in the Russian defence industry, as well as poorly supplied and trained soldiers. Once it was clear that a swift military victory which relied heavily on a Ukrainian capitulation, was not forthcoming, the subsequent ground war exposed the limitations of Russian military prowess. Not only did they wrongly prepare for a short war, they also seem divided amongst themselves around tactics and strategy.

Currently, around a quarter to a third of all Russian military hardware has been eliminated in this war and with sanctions crippling Russia’s ability to replenish stocks, they have resorted to importing less sophisticated weaponry and ammunition from Iran and North Korea. Furthermore, just under 62,000 of their soldiers have lost their lives, the largest number of causalities since World War Two. Russia’s subsequent conscription had led to a large evacuation of men of fighting age from the country and a sense amongst many ordinary people that this is fast becoming Russia’s Vietnam. Needless to say, public support for the war is evaporating as the number of body bags is increasing.

With Ukrainian morale at an all-time high and further promises of advanced weaponry and support from across the world, it is very difficult to see how Russia can achieve anything that can be construed as a victory. Putin will most likely focus his efforts on securing the eastern provinces of Luhansk and Donbas whilst hanging on to Crimea where sympathy towards Russia was traditionally the highest. With Ukraine now determined to take back every bit of lost territory, this will not be an easy task for the increasingly stretched Russian army in the face of a tactically superior foe who has the advantage of home terrain.

Whilst I don’t expect Putin to announce a withdrawal any time soon, or at all, this war will continue to strengthen the Ukrainian sense of unity and identity and bleed an already weakened Russia. He can continue to throw men at the problem, in the time honoured Russian military way, but this only makes him more unpopular at home. This dynamic could also lead to political changes in Moscow and that is perhaps the only realistic way this war could end.